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―Nothing fixes a thing so intensely in the memory as the wish 
to forget it.‖ — MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE 
 
―That the individual shall have full protection in person and in 
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been 
found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature 
and extent of such protection.‖ — SAMUEL D. WARREN and 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS
3
 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a time of remarkable opportunity for innovation and 
strategic information management, but also one of tremendous 
confusion.  We are on the one hand hearing from Facebook‘s Mark 
Zuckerberg and others that privacy is outdated, shut out by 
evolving social norms,
4
 while on the other hand hearing from the 
FTC‘s David Vladeck that privacy should be understood as 
housing a dignity interest.
5
  These disparate views have sparked 
some degree of bewilderment in United States lawyers and invite 
much-needed reflection on the very meaning of the term ―privacy.‖ 
Behavioral and data mining technologies are advancing at a 
rapid pace.
6
  As these technologies continue to advance, American 
companies—perhaps even those with the most established privacy 
protocols—are hounded in Europe for not doing enough to protect 
the information that these technologies gather.
7
  What is more, the 
 
 3 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193 (1890) (emphasis added).  
 4 See, e.g., Mashall Kirkpatrick, Facebook‟s Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy is 
Over, READWRITEWEB (Jan. 9, 2010, 9:25 PM), http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/ 
facebooks_zuckerberg_says_the_age_of_privacy_is_ov.php. 
 5 Stephanie Clifford, Fresh Views at Agency Overseeing Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/business/media/ 
05ftc.html?_r=1. 
 6 See generally id. (addressing data mining technologies used by Sears, which resulted 
in a recent lawsuit settled by the FTC).  
 7 See, e.g., John Hooper, Google Executives Convicted in Italy over Abuse Video, 
GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2010, at p1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/ 
2010/feb/24/google-video-italy-privacy-convictions (discussing the prosecution and 
conviction of Google‘s privacy officer, Peter Fleischer, in Italy); German Minister Takes 
on Google StreetView, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/ 
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conflicting messages regarding the definition of privacy—along 
with the significant divergences between the respective approaches 
of the United States and Continental Europe to data privacy and 
the inherent commercial obstacles those differences pose
8—prompt 
us to revisit the conventional construction of such foundational 
concepts as privacy and personal information.  Specifically, these 
distinctions prompt us to ask the question: what is the proper 
balance to be struck between the need to respect fundamental 
human rights and the demands of an ever-expanding digital 
economy?
9
  Questions like this are particularly relevant due to the 
advent of the ―Internet of Things,‖10 transcending the computer 
and creeping into everyday objects.
11
 
Out of this tension, and the relative legal vacuum 
 
international/germany/0,1518,676616,00.html.  
 8 Businesses in the European Economic Area (―EEA‖) are generally prohibited from 
sharing personal data with any company in the United States, even with a parent 
company in the United States, unless they take certain affirmative compliance steps to 
ensure an adequate level of data protection. See generally Regulation 45/2001, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by the Community 
Institutions and Bodies and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 2001 O.J. (L 8), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:008: 
0001:0022:en:PDF; Lisa J. Sotto, Aaron P. Simpson, & Boris Segalis, Law Firms Face 
Risks in Handling Personal Information, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, 
http://www.cnapro.com/pdf/LawFirmsFaceRisksHandlingPersonalInformation%20(Hunt
onWilliams).pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
 9 The international community has struggled to resolve challenges regarding the 
protection of intellectual property and right to privacy. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Rep. of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 
2011) (by Frank La Rue), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/ 
docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf. 
 10 The term ―Internet of Things‖ refers generally to linking of physical and virtual 
objects by means of radio frequency identification (RFID) and other capabilities.  This 
idea presumes the existence of highly autonomous data capture by computers, which 
would enable the tracking of things (even people) in real time.  This has significant 
implications for current notions of privacy and autonomy. See, e.g., IAN KERR, ON THE 
IDENTITY TRAIL: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE AND IMPACT OF ANONYMITY AND 
AUTHENTICATION IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 335 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
 11 See, e.g., Brian X. Chen, iPhone‟s Location-Data Collection Can‟t Be Turned Off, 
WIRED (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/04/iphone-location-opt-
out/. 
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characterizing modern privacy law, the controversial idea of a legal 
―right to be forgotten‖12 has emerged and is increasingly gaining 
traction in Europe, particularly in France and in Switzerland.
13
  
However, enshrining a so-called ―right to be forgotten‖, which 
empowers an individual in some instances to ―erase‖ certain online 
footprints in order to ―repair‖ reputational harms, clashes head-on 
with cherished legal values in America—foremost, the freedom of 
expression.
14
  Given the borderless nature of e-commerce, by 
virtue of which American  companies must contend with European 
regulation, the novel concept of a right to be forgotten—and 
perhaps more importantly the legal lacuna that birthed it—must be 
further explored through the lens of comparative inquiry. 
It stands to reason that the impetuses for that divisive 
proposal
15—namely, enshrining a right to be forgotten—are the 
 
 12 Such a right has been proposed by the European Union. See, e.g., Elizabeth Flock, 
Should We Have a Right to be Forgotten Online?, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2011, 12:23 
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/should-we-have-a-right-to-be-
forgotten-online/2011/04/20/AF2iOPCE_blog.html; Matt Warman, EU Proposes Online 
Right „To Be Forgotten‟, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 5, 2010, 12:55 PM), http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/technology/internet/8112702/EU-proposes-online-right-to-be-forgotten.html. 
 13 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, 
The Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions: A 
Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, at 2, 
COM (2010) 609 final (Nov, 4, 2010). See also generally, Mallet-Poujol, supra note 1; 
Emma Barnett, Sarkozy Prioritizes Internet Regulation at G8 Summit, TELEGRAPH (May 
24, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8531274/Sarkozy-
prioritises-internet-regulation-at-G8-summit.html; Chloé Woitier, Nicolas Sarkozy 
souhaite faire de la régulation d‟Internet un enjeu du G8 [Nicolas Sarkozy Wants to 
Make an Issue Out of Internet Regulation G8], LE MONDE.FR, (Jan. 11, 2011, 4 :04 PM), 
http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2011/01/11/nicolas-sarkozy-souhaite-faire-
de-la-regulation-d-internet-un-enjeu-du-g8_1464149_651865.html.  See also Franz 
Werro, The Right to be Informed v. the Right to be Forgotten : A TransAtlantic Clash, in 
HAFTUNGSRECHT IM DRITTEN MILLENIUM—LIABILITY IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 285–
300  (Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, Christine Godt, Peter Rott & Leslie Jane Smith eds., 
2009). 
 14 See, e.g., Manuel Baigorri & Emma Ross-Thomas, Google Challenges Five Privacy 
Orders by Regulator at Spanish Appeal Court, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 19, 2011, 6:32 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-19/google-challenges-five-privacy-orders-by-
regulator-at-spanish-appeal-court.html; John Hendel, In Europe, a Right to Be Forgotten 
Trumps the Memory of the Internet, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2011, 11:16 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/02/in-europe-a-right-to-be-
forgotten-trumps-the-memory-of-the-internet/70643/. 
 15 See infra notes 64–79 and accompanying text. 
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very shortcomings of the prevailing privacy framework, or indeed 
frameworks.  The relevant norms are anachronistically sectoral in 
the U.S,
16
 and are universally cumbersome, regardless of whether 
their provenance is public, as with government laws, or private, as 
in the case of Facebook‘s privacy statement.17  As such, these 
norms fail to shield users from the sorts of harm not easily 
remedied on an Internet of infinite memory.  And with respect to 
the burgeoning technologies of greatest relevance, such as 
analytics, the pertinent norms are also increasingly ineffective.
18
  
The rules are paradoxically too few or too many and range from 
what is arguably becoming a compliance, securities-style 
framework in the United States to a quasi-blanket prohibition on 
analytics in Germany.
19
 
On the Internet more is generally not better, and, in its 
complexity, the existing patchwork of privacy norms is rapidly 
falling into desuetude.
20
  Convoluted and dense privacy norms 
quickly undermine their very raison d‟être.21  The current attempts 
at regulation are, for the most part, predicated on an impoverished 
 
 16 See, e.g., Lisa J. Sotto, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK (Aspen 
Publishers 2011) (using the United States‘ legal framework as one such example). 
 17 According to the New York Times, Facebook‘s privacy policy is more than 5,000 
words—longer than the United States Constitution.  Nick Bilton, Price of Facebook 
Privacy? Start Clicking, N. Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at B8, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/05/13/technology/personaltech/13basics.html. 
 18 See, e.g., Best Practices, SEARCHDEX.COM, http://www.searchdex.com/ 
best_practices.shtml (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) (noting that one of its guiding principles 
is to help clients ensure compliance with search engines‘ guidelines). 
 19 See Tracy, Google Analytics Banned in Germany, UPVERY (Jan. 14, 2011), 
http://www.upvery.com/38606-google-analytics-banned-in-germany.html; see also Robin 
Wauters, Achtung! Google Analytics is Illegal, Say German Government Officials, 
TECHCRUNCH EUROPE (Nov. 24, 2009), http://eu.techcrunch.com/2009/11/24/google-
analytics-illegal-germany/.  
 20 See, e.g., Bilton, supra note 17, at B8. 
 21 See generally Chaire en Droit de la Sécurité et des Affaires Electroniques [Chair in 
Security Law and E-Business], BLOGUE JURIDIQUE: GAUTRAIS.COM, http://www.gautrais. 
com/-Blogue-juridique (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (Can.) (posting various French 
publications indicating that less is more online). See also Bilton, supra note 18, at B8.  
Regarding disclosures, David Vladeck remarked to the New York Times, ―I don‘t believe 
that most consumers either read them, or, if they read them, really understand it.‖  The 
Editors, An Interview with David Vladeck of the FTC, N.Y. TIMES: MEDIA DECODER 
BLOG (Aug. 5, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/an-
interview-with-david-vladeck-of-the-ftc/.  
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conception of privacy and ―personal information,‖ the latter being 
both over-and under-inclusive.
22
 
 Why do concepts matter?  Before we can go any further in 
crafting a meaningful, interoperable privacy harm-prevention 
policy, what we mean by privacy (and even ―personal 
information‖) needs to be rethought, paying particular attention to 
definitions across borders.  The global governance of data invites a 
cosmopolitan understanding of privacy law.
23
  ―Trans-systemic 
thought,‖ 24 defined as the ability ―to identify points of interface 
between systems‖ and harness them towards effective policy-
making and the creation of interoperable definitions of 
foundational concepts, is therefore of the essence. 
Concepts have very practical ramifications; they are the 
intellectual hooks used to put in place normative foundations 
which allow businesses to interact with regulators and clients on a 
global scale.
25
  Concepts can eventually help us posit an 
understanding of privacy that helps to reconcile diverging visions.  
They can also lead to effective global practices capable, for 
example, of distinguishing between counterproductive data mining 
and data mining that stimulates innovation without undermining 
the user trust upon which the digital economy ultimately 
depends.
26
 
 
 22 See, e.g., Bilton, supra note 18, at B8 (suggesting that Facebook‘s privacy policy is 
both over-and under-inclusive in terms of the personal information it protects—under-
inclusive in that the ―community pages‖ feature ―automatically links personal data, like 
hometown or university, to topic pages for that town or university,‖ and over-inclusive in 
that the only way to be removed from those pages is to delete the personal data from 
Facebook altogether). 
 23 Transsytemia is a concept articulated by McGill Law School in its explanation of its 
―transystemic legal education,‖ a unique model based on the world of borderless human 
interactions we live in today.  For a further explanation of transsytemia and the need for a 
cosmopolitan understanding of the law, see Transystemic Legal Education, MCGILL 
LAW: QUEBEC RESEARCH CENTRE OF PRIVATE AND COMPARATIVE LAW, http://www. 
mcgill.ca/crdpcq/transsystemic/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See, e.g., W. Park, Rules and Standards in Private International Law, 73 
ARBITRATION 441, 444–45 (2007). 
 26 See generally Usama Fayyad, Gregory Piatetsky-Shapiro & Padhraic Smyth, From 
Data Mining to Knowledge Discovery in Databases, 17 AI MAG. 37 (1996), available at 
http://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/aimagazine/article/view/1230/1131. Data mining 
refers to the identification of patterns in data through clustering and classifying 
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Accordingly, recognizing and bridging the cultural gap in 
policies and practices is crucial.  What we mean by these key 
concepts needs to be more clearly enunciated. Otherwise, 
Americans and others (including Continental Europeans, those 
living in APEC Countries, and many more) will find themselves 
speaking at each other using the same word (―privacy‖) with 
entirely different connotations.  The result is a technological 
―tower of Babel‖ with frustrating hurdles27 that ultimately prompts 
policy makers to conceive of ―privacy‖ and ―access‖ as hopelessly 
and inevitably adversarial terms. 
Conceptual uncertainty can also readily produce significant 
gaffes with unintended consequences.  Thus, for instance, when 
Oracle‘s CEO suggested that ―privacy is an illusion‖28 or when 
Sun System‘s Scott McNealy told us to ―get over‖ having no 
privacy,
29
 they—as Americans steeped in a privacy of expectation 
and seclusion
30—were presumably referring to what this paper 
labels an outdated notion of the concept, rather than one defined by 
control over personhood or freedom from reputational and related 
harms. 
In this vein, comparative inquiry can have important practical 
benefits.  It can recognize those underlying assumptions that 
generate conceptual obstacles to protecting privacy in the digital 
age, and it can eventually aid scholars and lawmakers in 
formulating more coherent policy in this area.  To best illustrate 
this point, this paper adopts the following structure.  Part I 
provides a succinct overview of the rationale animating privacy 
 
information, a process primarily used in analyzing collections of observations of 
behavior. See generally id.  
 27 See, e.g., Mike Swift, Battle Brewing over Control of Personal Data Online, 
PHYSORG.COM (June 29, 2011), http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-06-brewing-
personal-online.html.  Any information relating to an identifiable individual is considered 
―personal data.‖ Id.  This data may be contained in paper files, computer files, e-mails, 
film, etc. Id.  Privacy concerns have been growing in both Washington and Europe over 
the voluminous personal data being collected online. Id.   
 28 NDouglas, Larry Ellison‟s Privacy is Largely an Illusion, GAWKER (Feb 2, 2006, 
7:51 AM), http://valleywag.gawker.com/152187/larry-ellisons-privacy-is-largely-an-
illusion.  
 29 Private Lives? Not Ours!, PC WORLD (April 18, 2000), http://www.pcworld.com/ 
article/16331/private_lives_not_ours.html.  
 30 See infra Part I. 
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protections in Common Law jurisdictions, with particular emphasis 
on the United States.  It will highlight the ―growing disconnect 
between people‘s perception of privacy and the rapid growth of 
various forms of surveillance.‖31  Further, it will examine the 
challenges that the digital economy poses to an expectation-driven 
and spatially-defined standard of privacy.  Part II provides a brief 
survey of the increasingly fashionable ―right to be forgotten‖ and 
the factors driving this initiative in Europe.  It suggests that the 
recognition of such a right comes in response to an outdated and 
ineffective designation of privacy,
32
 which sparked a backlash of 
sorts in the face of our increasing inability to freely control the 
development of our ―digital‖ personhood transnationally.  
Whatever ultimately becomes of this ―right to be forgotten,‖ it is 
argued that this nascent European proposition‘s significance lies in 
its distinctive underlying vision of privacy, inviting us to consider 
an outcome-related, consumer-responsibility alternative to identity 
management in the age of predictive technologies.  Finally and 
relatedly, Part III proceeds to highlight the potential contribution of 
civilian thinking
33
 to refashioning the conceptual foundations of 
privacy policy.  More specifically, it suggests that privacy be re-
conceptualized as the right to mold one‘s identity autonomously 
along with the corollary duty not to compromise one‘s personal 
information unnecessarily in a digital age of infinite memory.
34
 
 
 31 See David Lyon, Globalizing Surveillance: Comparative and Sociological 
Perspectives, 19 INT‟L SOC. 135, 149 (2004) (discussing Canadians‘ penchant for 
acquiescing to surveillance from a sociological perspective). Lyon‘s study interestingly 
reveals that while Canadians do not seem to attach a very high value to their privacy, 
Quebeckers (governed by the civil law tradition) do. Id.  While that in itself by no means 
definitively points to the legal tradition‘s determinative influence on public perception of 
privacy, it does raise questions as to the law‘s impact on culture and vice versa.  
 32 The right has been increasingly criticized in the United States for this reason. See, 
e.g., Gordon Crovitz, Op-Ed., The Right to Privacy from Brandeis to Flickr, WALL ST. J., 
July 25, 2011, at A11, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903 
554904576461990729880756.html. 
 33 Specifically, this section relies on abstract views of the French and German models 
of civilian thinking. 
 34 This approach is arguably reflected (however subtly) in the Cour de Cassation‟s 
recent privacy case, Bruno B. vs. Giraud et Migot. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Paris, soc., Dec. 15, 2009, Bull civ. V, No. 2651 
(Fr.), available at http://www.juritel.com/Ldj_html-1485.html.  For an English analysis 
of the case, see Trevor Jefferies & Alvin F. Lindsay, New French Case Removes 
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I. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH 
In the United States and in the common law world generally, 
―[p]rivacy is best treated as a property right.  Property grants an 
owner the exclusive right to dispose of what he owns.  Privacy is 
the exclusive right to dispose of access to one‘s proper (private) 
domain.‖35 
Not surprisingly therefore, ―[i]n the United States, judicial 
protection of privacy depends on whether an individual has a 
reasonable expectation that the information in question will remain 
private.  Stated another way, the question is whether society 
recognizes the individual‘s claimed expectation of privacy as 
reasonable.‖36  Arguably this approach discounts context.  Indeed, 
the tendency to associate privacy externally or spatially with 
property, instead of as dignity inherent in personality, may not lend 
 
Automatic Privacy Shield From Employee E-Mails, Making Them More Amenable to US 
Discovery, HOGAN LOVELLS CHRONICLE OF DATA PROTECTION (Feb. 18, 2010),  
http://www.hldataprotection.com//2010/02/articles/litigation/new-french-case-removes-
automatic-privacy-shield-from-employee-emails-making-them-more-amenable-to-us-
discovery/.  For purposes of interoperability, this approach—not unlike the German 
court‘s fresh characterization of privacy as ―informational self-determination‖—can in 
turn be reconciled with a modernized common law notion of privacy as Liberty. See 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1983, 65 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (Ger.); Press Release, 
German Federal Constitutional Court, Provisions in the North-Rhine Westphalia 
Constitution Protection Act (Verfassungsschutzgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen) on Online 
Searches and on the Reconnaissance of the Internet Null and Void (Feb. 27, 2008), 
available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg08-022en.html 
(reiterating the right to informational self-determination: ―the manifestations of the 
general right of personality previously developed in the case-law of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, do not adequately take account of the need for protection arising as 
a consequence of the development of information technology.‖). See also Grundgesetz 
für die Bundersrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, 
BGBl. I, arts. 2, 10, 13  (Ger.) (highlighting that Dignity (article 2) is the only right read 
in conjunction with other rights); Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and 
Personality in German and American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963 
(1997); Eric Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-
Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 79, available at http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/ 
issues/43-1_Mitnick.pdf (arguing that liberty needs be understood  as ―comprising 
individual self-invention‖). 
 35 Ernest van den Haag, On Privacy, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 149, 150–51 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).  
 36 Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 847 (2002). 
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itself as well to realms outside the physical world, like 
cyberspace.
37
 
Although the rationales justifying the treatment of privacy as 
property may have found legitimacy in the past, today they are the 
object of increasing scrutiny and critique.
38
  This property-based or 
spatially-based construction which unconsciously, if not otherwise, 
continues to animate modern American privacy law is awkward in 
the information technology context.  For instance, this antiquated 
rationale would dictate that an individual has few or no privacy 
rights in the public realm—or indeed in most of cyberspace, which 
now includes the Internet of things
39—where it would be 
unreasonable to expect to be left alone.
40
 
Thus, North American scholars tend to embark on 
discussions of privacy with the origins of the 
invasion of privacy tort, born of a seminal article 
titled ―The Right to Privacy‖.  Though seldom 
addressed, the historical roots of that right in 
common-law England are particularly instructive.  
Under the English common law, the right to privacy 
was first recognized by virtue of its intricate link to 
personal property. This is best evidenced by the 
now infamous saying, ―[T]he house of every one is 
his castle,‖ first coined by the House of Lords in 
 
 37 Karen Eltis, The Judicial System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship 
Between Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber Context, 56 MCGILL L.J. 289, 313 
(2011). See also Eberle, supra note 34 at 974; James Q. Whitman, The Two Western 
Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1181 (2004) 
(discussing dignity in the civilian culture as it pertains to privacy). 
 38 See generally Eltis, supra note 37. 
 39 See id. at 24–26.   
 40 Take, for instance, the example of wiretapping in the United States.  Strikingly 
symptomatic of the emergent tendency to anticipate, expect, and even acquiesce to 
privacy intrusions once considered untenable, recent polls indicate that most Americans 
deem warrantless wiretapping of their private phone conversations and email 
―reasonable.‖ Many Americans Accept NSA Surveillance, ANGUS REID (Mar. 12, 2006), 
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/11692/many_americans_accept_nsa_surveillance. 
According to the Angus Reid report, ―Many adults in the United States see nothing 
wrong with the domestic electronic surveillance program initiated by their federal 
government, according to a poll by TNS released by the Washington Post and ABC 
News. [Fifty-four] percent of respondents think wiretapping telephone calls and emails 
without court approval is an acceptable way to investigate terrorism.‖ Id.  
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Semayne‟s Case (now colloquially known as ―a 
man‘s home is his castle‖).  This alluded to the 
conception that a person‘s right to privacy 
fundamentally derives from his property rights.  In 
view of that, the right to privacy was initially 
recognized in relation to trespass, thus confirming 
what was, for many years, the reigning conception 
of privacy as rooted in ownership.  This brief 
historical aperçu at the very least elucidates the 
understanding of privacy as the right to be left alone 
in given spaces, defined externally rather than 
inherently to personhood.
41 
This historical review similarly sheds light on the narrow 
conception of and repeated references to seclusion offered in 
contemporary tort law discourse.
42
  But what role might the notion 
of seclusion play when, to paraphrase the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Wise, ―many, if not the majority, of our activities are 
inevitably carried out in the plain view of other persons.‖43  The 
Common Law-based theory, featuring seclusion-oriented, 
expectation-driven overarching principles, fuels most if not all 
current privacy regulations.  However, as basic assumptions about 
privacy evolve, this theory no longer lends itself to the meaningful 
development of a coherent legal framework for protecting digital 
identity.
44
 
The seclusion-centered approach is particularly insufficient 
when it comes to managing the global flow of data.  In the 
 
 41 Eltis, supra note 37, at 312 (internal citations omitted).   
 42 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–
1860 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977) (observing how the conception of property changed 
from an eighteenth-century view that dominion over land conferred the power to prevent 
others‘ interference to the nineteenth-century assumption that the essential attribute of 
property ownership was the power to develop it irrespective of the consequences to 
others); Jordan E. Segall, Note, Google Street View: Walking the Line of Privacy-
Intrusion Upon Seclusion and Publicity Given to Private Facts in the Digital Age, 10 U. 
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL‘Y 1 (2010) (discussing tort claims of intrusion upon seclusion). 
 43 R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S. C. R. 527, 564–65 (Can.), available at http://scc.lexum. 
umontreal.ca/en/1992/1992rcs1-527/1992rcs1-527.html.  
 44 See Eltis, supra note 37, at 312 (explaining that the digital identity requires privacy 
rights attached to ―persons rather than property, irrespective of property or special 
constraints‖). 
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information age, the ―reasonable expectation‖ standard tends to 
reinforce social tolerance of intrusions once deemed unreasonable 
in other contexts.
45
  Paradoxically, the more we are watched, the 
less privacy we expect; the less we are personally bothered, the 
more we expect others to share in our complacency.  Therefore, if 
privacy continues to be defined by reference to reasonable 
expectations and seclusion, the sphere in which one can reasonably 
claim ―solitude‖ will contract.46 
Perhaps this is why civil law and other jurisdictions in Asia for 
instance, are shifting towards a ―legitimate‖ rather than 
―reasonable‖ expectation model, and focusing instead on 
personhood and moral autonomy in this context.
47
  The privacy 
framework offered by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, for 
example, illustrates the civilian approach in a broader sense and 
focuses specifically on harm.
48
  Others, as further discussed, have 
gone even further in embracing the personal autonomy approach to 
privacy by proposing a legally enshrined ―right to be forgotten.‖49 
 
 
 45 See Spencer, supra note 36, at 844 (―We find imprecision embedded in the 
expectation-driven conception of privacy because of the inevitable gray area between 
what society clearly expects to be protected (that is, private), and what it clearly 
understands to be unprotected. Effective encroachment occurs through incremental 
incursions into this gray area of unsettled expectations. Moreover, individuals internalize 
each incremental step of encroachment, and thereby lose any sense that privacy was once 
possible in the encroached upon area. Because of this internalization, the expectation-
driven privacy test cannot account for the cumulative effect of successive encroachments. 
Instead, its focus on the current level of expectations facilitates the incremental erosion of 
privacy.‖). 
 46 See generally Eltis, supra note 37. 
 47 See id. at 314.  
 48 See Paula J. Bruening, APEC Roundup: Update on Accountability Agents in 
Implementation Of the APEC Framework, Development of Pathfinder Projects, Privacy 
& Security L. Rep. No. 9PVLR1444 (Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://www.hunton. 
com/files/Publication/1fd96285-2d28-4c2a-a4dd-d71f60777315/ Presentation/Publication 
Attachment/aa33f70e-9f45-49d1-a76c-fab3b481f0e1/Bruening_APEC_BNA_Oct-
2010.pdf.  
 49 See infra Part III; see also Bruno Waterfield, „Right to be Forgotten‟ Proposed by 
European Commission, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 5, 2010, 1:38 AM), http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/technology/news/8111866/Right-to-be-forgotten-proposed-by-European-
Commission.html.  
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II. THE ―RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN‖: A BACKLASH? 
While the civil law approach to privacy does offer significant 
benefits in the digital world, current governance of privacy—
including even the novel ―right to be forgotten‖ theory—presents 
some difficulties.  Taking a somewhat reductionist view, there are 
three potential ways to address the conceptual difficulties that stem 
from the privacy paradigm.  The first is to overregulate the area in 
an effort to keep up with the changing technologies.  The second is 
to take a more case-specific approach to alleged misuses of 
personal information.  Finally, the third approach, which this 
article posits is necessary to prevent the emergence of faddish 
proposals, like the ―right to be forgotten,‖ takes a more principled 
approach, while not overregulating. 
The first view attempts to correct the shortcomings of the 
current, lamentably anachronistic (common law) understanding of 
privacy by piling on the regulation.  This type of response is 
exemplified in a different context by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.
50
  While it is certainly beyond the scope of this endevor to 
offer any in-depth discussion on point, suffice it to note that the 
regulation-intensive Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in response 
to a wave of large-scale corporate accounting scandals.
51
  But a 
knee-jerk, ―Sarbanes-Oxley‖ approach to data protection, however 
well-intentioned, tends to be informed by panic;
52
in the privacy 
 
 50 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
title 15 of the United States Code).  
 51 See Michael A. Thomason, Auditing the PCAOB: A Test to the Accountability of the 
Uniquely Structured Regulator of Accountants, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1953, 1954–55 (2009); 
Omar Ochoa, Note, Accounting for FASB: Why Administrative Law Should Apply to the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 489, 492–93 (2011).  
The SEC has relaxed the regulations somewhat since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, in 
an effort to lure back foreign companies to list in the United States. Seven Davidoff, With 
Facebook, Debate Renews over I.P.O. Regulation, N.Y. TIMES: DEAL BOOK (Jan. 11, 
2011, 7:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/with-facebook-debate-renews-
over-i-p-o-regulation/. 
 52 Henry N. Butler & Larry Rubenstein, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: HOW TO FIX 
IT AND WHAT WE‘VE LEARNED 1 (2006), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/ 
20060308_ButlerRibsteinSOXDraft313.pdf.  
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context, this panic takes the form of  ―technology must keep up‖.53  
Such a regulation-heavy approach tends to be ineffective and 
indeed risks inadvertently punishing innovation while doing little 
to protect the global consumer.
54
  Like the much maligned U.S.-
security framework, onerous rules ill-adapted to a global digital 
economy place privacy in an antagonistic relationship with 
progress.
55
  This in turn paradoxically encourages companies to 
shift their focus to creatively sidestepping these rules in order to 
avoid their chilling effects, rather than on meaningful privacy 
protection.
56
 
It bears repeating: the law cannot keep chasing after 
technology; it will inevitably (by its very nature) be outpaced, 
often before the proverbial ink dries. As Eric Schmidt once 
observed ―High tech runs three times faster than normal business. 
And the government runs three times slower than normal 
businesses. So we have a nine-times gap.‖57  To account for this 
inevitable outpacing, a second approach was developed which 
attempts to reconcile privacy and innovation.  This second 
 
 53 Milo Tiannopoulos, The Law Must Learn to Keep Up with Technology, TELEGRAPH 
(Nov. 12, 2010 9:16 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8128252/The-
law-must-learn-to-keep-up-with-technology.html. 
 54 See, e.g., Vincent Gautrais, L‟encadrement Juridique du Cyberconsommateur 
Québécois [The Lawful Supervision of the Quebec Cyberconsumer], in DROIT DU 
COMMERCE ÉLECTRONIQUE 261 (Thémis 2002); Marc Lacoursière & Charlaine Bouchard, 
Les Enjeux du Contrat de Consommation en Ligne [The Challenges of Online Consumer 
Contract], 33 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 373, 395 (2004) (observing that complicated 
online policies make an overly informed consumer more like an uninformed consumer);  
see also generally Jean Michel Bruguière, La protection du cyber-consommateur dans la 
loi pour la confiance dans l‘économie numérique, DROIT DE L‘IMMATÉRIEL (2005) 
(similarly arguing that too much information paradoxically leaves the consumer 
uninformed).  
 55 See, e.g., How Speed Traders are Changing Wall Street, CBS NEWS (Oct. 11, 2010 
1:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/10/07/60minutes/main6936075.shtml 
(discussing the algorithm-commanded trading occurring at the New York Stock 
Exchange).   
 56 Nigel Kendall, Privacy Matters: How Can Firms Make the Most of the 
Opportunities in Online Personal Data While Retaining Individuals‟ Right to Privacy?, 
WALL ST. J.  (June 29, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB1000144052702303714704576382892280173266.html. 
57 Gordon L. Crovitz, Google Speaks Truth to Power, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2011, at A13, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702046187045766453531 
64833940.html. 
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approach, critics argue, is embodied in the recent McCain-Kerry 
proposal.
58
  The proposal, now known as the Commercial Privacy 
Bill of Rights Act of 2011,
59
 may very well fall under this second 
category.
60
  But in the race against implacable technology, the end 
result of such efforts is often counter-productive.  Thus, for 
example, many privacy advocates argue that the McCain-Kerry 
framework‘s broad and arguably circular definition of ―necessary‖ 
(for data collection purposes) ties regulators‘ hands.61  They further 
posit that this definition effectively serves to undermine even 
meager pre-existing protections by gifting an easy defense to over-
collectors of personal information.
62
  This defense, in turn, 
incentivizes the crafting of (even more) cumbersome policies that 
would define most such data as ―necessary.‖63 
 
 58 See generally Edward A. Morse, From Private to Public Ordering: An Expanding 
Federal Role for Regulating Privacy and Data Security, 2011 BUS. LAW TODAY 1 (2011), 
available at  http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2011/07/article-morse.shtml.  
 59 S. 799, 112th Cong. §§ 3(6), 202(b), 501(a) (2011) [hereinafter Commercial Privacy 
Act], available at http://epic.org/privacy/consumer/Commercial_Privacy_Bill_of_ 
Rights_Text.pdf; Press Release, Sen. John Kerry, Kerry, McCain Introduce Commercial 
Privacy: Bi-Partisan Legislation Would Enhance Protection and Control of Personal 
Information (Apr. 12, 2011), http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=59a56001-5430-
4b6d-b476-460040de027b [hereinafter Kerry, Press Release]. 
 60 Kerry, Press Release, supra note 59. 
 61 See Dan Tynan, Five Big Problems with That New Privacy Bill of Rights, IT WORLD 
(Apr. 13, 2011, 2:25 PM), http://www.itworld.com/security/155667/five-big-problems-
new-privacy-bill-rights.  The Commercial Privacy Act exempts from the definition of 
―unauthorized use‖ any ―use that is necessary for the improvement of transaction or 
service delivery through research, testing analysis, and development‖ and any ―use that is 
necessary for internal operations, including . . . information collected by an Internet 
website about the visits to such website and the click-through rates at such website—to 
improve website navigation and performance. . .‖ Commercial Privacy Act, supra note 
59, at § 3(8)(B)(vii)–(viii)(II).  
 62 See Tynan, supra note 61.  
 63 See, e.g., Grant Gross, Kerry, McCain Introduced Online Privacy Bill, PC WORLD 
(April 12, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/224969/ 
kerry_mccain_introduced_online_privacy_bill.html (―The loopholes in the bill ‗could 
leave consumers feeling that they‘re far more protected than they are,‘ said John 
Simpson, consumer advocate at Consumer Watchdog.  The bill may limit the FTC from 
charging online businesses with unfair or deceptive practices in privacy cases, Simpson 
added.  If the bill was law, the FTC may not have been able to enter into a March 
settlement with Google over privacy complaints about its social-media Buzz product, he 
said.‖); see also Jeremy Byellin, Senators Kerry, McCain Introduce “Privacy Bill of 
Rights” Bill, WESTLAW INSIDER (April 18, 2011), http://westlawinsider.com/top-legal-
news/senators-kerry-mccain-introduce-privacy-bill-of-rights-bill/. 
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The failure of the first and second approaches to privacy, 
therefore, invites a third option—an option which should be a 
principled rather than pigeonholed approach to privacy.  The 
absence, however, of such an option (at the national, let alone 
transnational level) creates a vacuum out of which faddish 
proposals, such as the ―right to be forgotten,‖ emerge. 
A. The “Faddish” Proposal and its Impetus 
Presumably as a backlash to what are, not unreasonably, 
perceived as thoroughly ineffective, cumbersome, or simply 
outpaced practices and initiatives on this side of the Atlantic, the 
E.U., French Senate members
64
 and other European figures and 
institutions
65
 have begun advocating for the recognition of a legal 
―right to be forgotten.‖  Simply put, the argument is that if we 
cannot find a way to protect privacy ab initio, then we must correct 
matters after the fact by bestowing a right upon individuals to 
retroactively ―erase‖ that which might harm them.66 That which, 
this article submits, might otherwise have disappeared from public 
view in time, if not for the Internet age‘s unprecedented infinite 
memory.  The counterargument to the right to be forgotten 
movement emphasizes its countervailing values—namely, freedom 
of expression, access to information and the integrity of the public 
record.
67
 
Not surprisingly then, recurring questions in the debate over ab 
initio or post facto privacy protection focus on how the Internet 
differs from past or similar mediums (such as the printed press, 
where no such right exists) and why the explosion of the Internet 
 
 64 See Senators Yves Détraigne & Anne-Marie Escoffier,  La vie privée à l‘heure des 
mémoires numériques. Pour une confiance renforcée entre citoyens et société de 
l‘information [Privacy in the Era of Digital Memories. For Increased Confidence 
Between Citizens and the Information Society], Information Report No. 441 (2008–09), 
on behalf of the Commission of Laws, filed May 27, 2009.  
 65 Most notably and inter alia is Spain‘s Privacy Commissioner. See David Roman, 
Google Contests Spain‟s Privacy Laws, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2011), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703396604576087573944344348.html. 
 66 See, e.g., Mallet-Poujol, supra note 1. 
 67 See Mallet-Poujol, supra note 1. See generally Werro, supra note 13. 
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prompts revisiting or even re-interpreting existing norms.
68
 
In a world with an Internet of infinite memory,
69
 like ours, it 
stands to reason that many of us have quite possibly and irrefutably 
lost control over our identity—how we are perceived when our 
―portrait‖ is amateurishly assembled in the aggregate online— and 
possibly even our existence.
70
  Consider the example of the 
Spanish plastic surgeon, Hugo Guidotti Russo, which spearheads 
the legal battle over the ―right to be forgotten‖ in Europe.71  This 
particular surgeon‘s fight with Google over his reputation may 
change the meaning of accuracy of information and freedom of 
expression in the digital age.
72
 
Over twenty years ago, Russo had a widely covered dispute 
with one of his patients over an allegedly botched breast surgery.
73
  
Since the incident, Russo has ostensibly practiced successfully or 
at least without incident.  However, the mere mention of his name 
online produces a myriad of results all linked to the supposedly 
bungled and very gruesome procedure.
74
  The results discussing 
the alleged twenty-year old mishap appear at the top of the results 
list and dramatically overshadow—even overwhelm—any and all 
other presumably relevant, and more recent information relating to 
his practice.  Accordingly, Russo‘s professional persona—and 
indeed identity (online and off)—has been forever tainted and 
possibly reduced to what he contends is an isolated incident, which 
 
 68 See Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change?, 
8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 589, 595 (2007). 
 69 Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 25, 
2010, at MM30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-
t2.html.  
 70 See, e.g., Zick Rubin, How the Internet Tried to Kill Me, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
2011, at WK11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/opinion/13rubin. 
html?_r=2. 
 71 Flock, supra note 12. 
 72 Russo is one of ninety Spanish citizens who successfully lobbied Spain‘s Data 
Portection Agency toward adopting a ―right to be forgotten‖ mindset online. See id. 
 73 Paul Sonne, Max Colchester & David Roman, Plastic Surgeon and Net‟s Memory 
Figure in Google Face-Off in Spain, WALL ST. J., Mar.7, 2011, at B1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703921504576094130793996412.html#
ixzz1Htm1hM8q. 
 74 See Flock, supra note 12.   
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was settled over twenty years ago.
75
 
The Internet, being the first go-to destination for people when 
confronted with a query, is posing significant difficulties for 
Russo.  Many of Russo‘s patients and potential clients, colleagues 
or business associates use Internet search databases as their first 
destination for information and the gruesome reports presumably 
dissuade all but the rare, most dedicated and meticulous searchers 
who would take pains to go beyond these headlines.  The cyber 
search at the very least provides a decontextualized and 
fragmented version of Russo‘s career and professional identity—
the very difficulty the right to be forgotten, drawing on the Statute 
of Limitations rationale, purports to remedy.  Such a version is due 
to the hierarchical nature of search engine results and their order, 
which, as far as is known due to trade secret issues, takes little 
account of chronology or other pertinent factors.  Perhaps giving 
greater weight to time in search result ranking would serve to 
alleviate some of the distortions caused by dated information 
overshadowing more current data in the online context and 
therefore should be considered by informational intermediaries as 
they prepare to contend with cases like Russo's.  If Russo succeeds 
in his campaign against Google and Spain successfully sends his 
case to the European Court of Justice,
76
 it could lead to a major 
European ruling on online personal data and on the so-called right 
to be forgotten on the Internet.
77
 
As illustrated, eternally enshrined falsehoods—or even 
decontextualized truths—online boast an aura of accuracy and are 
not easily remedied by truths or offline context.  The difficulty of 
proving an otherwise irrefutable fact online is amusingly illustrated 
by a piece in the New York Times written by Zick Rubin, aptly 
titled ―How the Internet Tried to Kill Me.‖ 78  Rubin chronicles his 
own painful struggle with search engines and numerous fruitless 
attempts to prove that he was still alive after a clerical error listed 
 
 75 See Sonne, Clochester & Roman, supra note 73, at B1. 
 76 See e.g., Josh Halliday, Europe‟s Highest Court to Rule on Google Privacy Battle in 
Spain, GUARDIAN, (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/01/ 
google-spain-privacy-court-case. 
 77 Sonne, Clochester & Roman, supra note 73, at B1. 
 78 Rubin, supra note 65. 
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him as deceased.  In reality, Rubin had merely changed 
professions.
79
 
Businesses face similar difficulties, particularly in terms of the 
decontextualized and fragmented nature of information online.  For 
example, consider a popular restaurant‘s fate on a commonly 
visited review site. While majority of user reviews of New York 
City‘s Tapeo 29 are positive, culminating in an overall review of 
3.5 stars, eight reviews paint a dreadful picture of the restaurant.
80
  
While these eight reviews comprise only six percent of the total 
customer reviews, they presumably may be enough to discourage 
future patrons from visiting the establishment.  Luckily for Tapeo, 
these negative reviews are dispersed throughout pages of reviews 
potentially minimizing the negative impact, but not all restaurants 
are so lucky.  One reviewer of Tart, a Los Angeles restaurant, 
posted on the review site complaining about the restaurant‘s turkey 
meatloaf.
81
  Tart‘s owner complained to the website, mainly 
because Tart does not serve turkey meatloaf, but the website 
refused to remove the one-star review.
82
  These damaging, 
potentially false, reviews are frequent occurrences for businesses, 
often leaving them with no choice but to hire consultants who 
 
79     Id. (―When I Googled myself last month, I was alarmed to find the following item, 
from a Wikia.com site on psychology, ranked fourth among the results: ‗Zick Rubin 
(1944-1997) was an American social psychologist.‘ This was a little disconcerting.  I 
really was born in 1944 and I really was an American social psychologist.  Before I 
entered law school in midlife, I was a professor of psychology at Harvard and Brandeis 
and had written books in the field.  But, to the very best of my knowledge, I wasn‘t dead . 
. . When I complained to Wikia.com, I got a prompt and friendly reply from its co-
founder, Angela Beesley, sending me her ‗kind regards‘ and telling me that she had 
corrected the article.  But when I checked a week later, the ‗1944-1997‘ had returned.  So 
I e-mailed her again (subject line: ‗inaccurate report that I am dead‘), and got the 
following explanation: My change to the page was reverted on the grounds that the info 
included in this article was sourced from Reber and Reber‘s the Dictionary of 
Psychology, third edition, 2001. Is it possible the page is talking about a different Zick 
Rubin? The article is about a social psychologist.‘  I didn‘t doubt that the Dictionary of 
Psychology was a highly authoritative source, and yet I persisted in wondering why 
Reber—or, for that matter, Reber—would know more than I would about whether I was 
alive or dead.‖) 
 80 See Reviews for Tapeo 29, YELP.COM, http://www.yelp.com/biz/tapeo-29-new-york 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2011).  
81      Claire Cain Miller, The Review Site Yelp Draws Some Outcries of its Own, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/ 
technology/start-ups/03yelp.html?_r=1. 
82      See id. 
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flood the net with (sometimes false) information, meant to distract 
from the negative or unwanted data. 
It bears emphasis that the harm complained of in these cases is 
not in the mere fact of being observed, as many individuals and 
businesses actively seek out digital notoriety and arguably benefit 
from personalized consumerism or targeted ads.  Rather, the 
concern lies in being—perhaps perpetually—mislabeled within a 
web of infinite memory.  Furthermore, the web now extends to the 
offline world, through for example the Internet of things, and 
leaves one powerless to assert or develop an image or identity 
independently of the online content, which now spills into—and 
offline reality.  Plainly put, this powerlessness flies in the face of 
the American ideal of reinventing oneself and likely has 
consequences yet unknown.  One obvious result might of course be 
to chill online speech, as individuals and indeed corporations grow 
increasingly weary of having voluntarily posted data irreparably 
manipulated or inadvertently distorted. 
Of course, some may take the position of Google's Eric 
Schmidt, namely ―if you have something that you don‘t want 
anyone to know maybe you shouldn‘t be doing it in the first 
place.‖83  The difficulty in that approach lies in its erroneous 
assumption of choice and ostensible understanding of individuals 
as static over time.  In fact, personal identity is dynamic (now more 
than ever) and while one's sixteen year-old self might indeed 
consciously choose to post certain information about themselves 
(at that particular stage of life online) her thirty and even sixty 
year-old self (with presumably entirely different notions of what is 
considered appropriate) will have to live with the consequences of 
that supposedly ―informed‖ decision.  While it is certainly true that 
we must live with the irremediable consequences of the (often 
foolish) choices and tragically missed opportunities of our younger 
selves for all eternity, the distinction brought to bear by the digital 
age is chiefly the following: human memory is nothing if not 
fallible.  As the French correctly observe:  ―la memoire est une 
faculte qui oublie‖ or, translated, ―memory is a faculty that 
forgets.‖  In other words, memory is fallible and distinctively so by 
 
83     Inside the Mind of Google (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 3, 2009). 
ELTIS (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  1:58 PM 
2011] BREAKING THROUGH THE “TOWER OF BABEL” 89 
design to allow us to recreate the past in a way we can live within 
our own minds; to move on; to forgive ourselves and others for 
mistakes we may not be able to correct. The Internet quite simply 
vitiates any such forgiveness and we have yet to find a 
normative—or social mechanism for that matter—capable of 
assuaging the difficulties created by the significant change to our 
social order brought on by the absence of the  (often healthy and 
normal) process of forgetting. 
Even worse, as with Zick Rubin‘s experience, a version of 
one‘s identity that is entirely incompatible with one‘s own truth—
or perhaps even ―the truth‖—might become entrenched as public 
record.  The (quintessentially American) capacity to reinvent 
oneself, aptly illustrated most recently in the popular TV series 
Mad Men, or even to evolve in one‘s views and ideas, is therefore 
either lost or severely compromised.
84
 
These concerns are made worse yet by the chief and 
increasingly tempting ―remedy‖ now offered by online image 
consulting firms (or Internet ―reputation management‖ firms).  
These firms deliberately flood the net with false data in an effort to 
confuse and distract from damaging existing information that 
cannot be removed.
85
  This seems to threaten any integrity or 
reliability the Internet may have had—and must have—for its 
effective survival.   
 
 
 84 See Bill Keveney, Stars of „Mad Men‟ share thoughts on their characters, USA 
TODAY (July 16, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/life/television/news/2010-07-16-
madmen16_VA_N.htm (describing the characters of the show and elaborating on the 
development of the characters—their reinvention—throughout the seasons). 
85     See, e.g., Mark Bunting & Roy Lipski, Drowned Out? Rethinking Corporate 
Reputation Management for the Internet, 5 J. COMMC‘N MGMT. 170, 175–77 (2000); 
Loretta Chao, China Shutters 6,600 Websites for Manipulating Information Online, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2011, 7:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/ 
08/29/china-shutters-6600-websites-for-manipulating-information-online/ (―The websites 
involved ‗illegal groups which claimed to specialize in deleting online news stories and 
posts with negative influences or hiring other netizens to spread certain kinds of 
information or opinions on the Internet‘ for deals totaling more than 1.13 million yuan 
($177,000).‖); Claire Prentice, Online Profile Spring Cleaning, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11381037 (―For a fee, [online reputation 
managers] will monitor what is written about clients and drown out unwanted comments 
or photographs by creating or sourcing a barrage of positive Google-friendly content.‖). 
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III. THE CIVIL LAW VIEW 
A. The Right to be Forgotten‟s Underlying Rationale: Throw out 
the Bathwater but Consider the Baby 
As previously noted, the ―right to be forgotten,‖ in addition to 
being contentious and far from entrenched in European law or 
practice, does not lend itself to the American context.  
Notwithstanding these issues, the legal thinking underlying the 
right to be forgotten may itself be useful in reframing the right to 
privacy in the digital age, even given what some jurisdictions 
would label the absolutist U.S. approach to freedom of 
expression.
86
  Thus for example, concepts like ―la 
responsabilisation de l‟individu,‖ roughly translated as individual 
responsibility, appear in both European and American practice, and 
help translate the E.U.‘s privacy principle into American dialect.87  
For instance, the French Senate Report addressing the Right to be 
Forgotten stresses a ―homo numericus‖ or ―protector of his own 
data‖ approach to privacy, allowing the individual more control 
over his or her personal information—granting control over the 
duration of data retention and facilitating easier deletion of posted 
information.
88
 
Therefore, while at first glance the European approach (in a 
broader sense) appears to complicate matters by emphasizing the 
seemingly obscure notion of dignity, it ultimately helps clarify 
matters by adding a ―duty‖ component for both the individuals and 
the information-users to the ever-nebulous right to privacy.
89
  
 
 86 Berin Szoka, “Privacy” as Censorship: Fleischer Dismantles the EU‟s “Right to 
Forget”, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Mar. 9, 2011), http://techliberation.com/2011/03/09/ 
privacy-as-censorship-fleischer-dismantles-the-eus-right-to-forget/. 
 87 See Deborah Collier, Privacy Working Group Holds Panel Discussion on „Right to 
be Forgotten‟, SWINE LINE (Aug. 1, 2011), http://swineline.org/?p=5773; Natch Greyes, 
A Right to be Forgotten, WM. & MARY L. SCH. STUDENT INTELL. PROP. SOC‘Y (June 17, 
2011), http://sips.blogs.wm.edu/2011/06/17/a-right-to-be-forgotten/. 
 88 Christian Cointat, Proposed legislation to better guarantee the right to privacy in 
the digital age, Report No. 330 (2009–2010), on behalf of the Judiciary Committee, filed 
Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.senat.fr/rap/l09-330/l09-330_mono.html. 
 89 See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, „La Difference‟ is Stark in EU, U.S. Privacy Laws, MSNBC, 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/15221111/ns/technology_and_science-privacy_lost/t/la-
difference-stark-eu-us-privacy-laws (last updated Oct. 19, 2006, 11:19 AM) (describing 
the various consent requirements for information usage in many parts of Europe).  
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Moreover, in the German view, for instance, privacy, conceived at 
least in part as ―informational self-determination,‖90 comprises 
both rights and duties.  The German Constitutional Court, in its 
now-famous Census decision, held that the ―‗basic right [of 
informational self-determination] warrants [. . .] the capacity of the 
individual to determine in principle the disclosure and use of 
his/her personal data.‘‖91  ―Rather than giving exclusive control or 
a property interest to the data subject, the right of informational 
self-determination compels the State to organize data processing so 
that personal autonomy will be respected.  Thus, the right both 
limits certain actions and obliges other activities on the part of the 
State.‖92 
Thus, control over personal information is the power to control 
a measure of one‘s identity.  This is indispensable to the ―free 
unfolding of personality.‖93  It is also a right to a ―rightful 
portrayal of self,‖94 crucial in the digital age, as illustrated by the 
case of Dr. Russo above.  Russo‘s own loss of control over his 
―portrayal of self‖ indeed catapulted the right to be forgotten 
movement in Europe to where it is today, at least in part. 
Another example of the duty-driven thinking, from the French 
perspective this time, is the recent privacy case, Bruno B. v. 
Giraud et Migot,
95
 in which the Cour de cassation qualified its 
 
 90 65 BVerfGE 1, 41–52 (1983); Paul Schwartz, The Computer in German and 
American Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right of Informational Self-
Determination, 37 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 675, 687 (1989), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/840221.pdf?acceptTC=true.  
 91 Andras Jori, DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 3.2 (2006), 
http://www.dataprotection.eu/pmwiki/pmwiki.php?n=Main.SecondGeneration. See also 
Eberle, supra note 34, at 1009 (―A more innovative aspect of informational self-
determination is that it endows individuals with the right to control the portrayal of the 
facts and details of their lives, even if uncomfortable or embarrassing. This right 
empowers persons to shield hurtful truths from public scrutiny in order to safeguard 
reputation or other personality interests. The right also encompasses protection of 
personal honor as an outgrowth of personality.‖). 
 92 Schwartz, supra note 90, at 690.  
 93 Eberle, supra note 34, at 966.  
 94 Eberle, supra note 34, at 1014. 
 95 Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Paris, soc., Dec. 15, 
2009, Bull civ. V, No. 2651. 
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earlier ruling in Nikon France SA Co. v. Onof.
96
  The Court in 
Bruno opined that Bruno B.‘s employer was justified in opening 
emails it assumed to be work related, since the employee, Bruno, 
failed to explicitly mark the documents as ―private.‖97  This 
decision significantly shifts the burden to enforce privacy 
expectations onto employees.
98
  This in turn implies and indeed 
reiterates that under the Civilian notion of privacy, individuals—
employees and arguably consumers by analogy—have not only 
broad rights but also duties to safeguard their privacy—obligations 
to enlighten would-be violators as to when they expect privacy by 
taking affirmative steps in that direction (such as marking an email 
―private‖).  The privacy duty not only empowers individuals but 
also appreciably reduces uncertainty by eliminating some of the 
guesswork related to people‘s expectations of privacy in the digital 
age and lessens the fear of unwanted intrusions.
99
 
B. Personality Rights and Countervailing Duties 
The fact that Civilians typically regard rights as implying 
countervailing duties is often neglected in recurring discussions of 
those rights.  In civilian tradition, privacy is considered to be a 
―personality right,‖ but the concept of personality rights is alien to 
the common law.
100
  Therefore, in civil law jurisdictions, privacy 
 
 96 Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Paris, soc., Oct. 2, 
2001, Bull civ. V, No. 4164, available at http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/ 
chambre_sociale_576/arret_n_1159.html (holding (to the great dismay of U.S. firms) that 
personal dignity precluded employers from opening employee emails). 
 97 Bruno B., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Paris, 
soc., Dec. 15, 2009, Bull civ. V, No. 2651. 
 98 See Jeffries & Lindsey, supra note 34.  The case, however, has been criticized and is 
merely a first step. See generally id. As the purpose of this piece is not to analyze 
European case law but rather to provide an overview of the underlying civilian 
philosophy as it pertains to reconceptualizing privacy, the significance of the Bruno B. 
ruling lies at a much higher level of abstraction, namely, the seldom discussed Civilian 
focus on duties as a corollary of rights and its application to privacy in the realm of 
analytics. 
 99 See, e.g., Tanzinia Vega, A Call for a Federal Office to Guide Online Privacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at B3, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/business/ 
media/17privacy.html. 
 100 See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 34, at 973 (with respect to German thinking in 
particular, observing that: ―By comparison, American law has never really sought to 
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attaches to persons rather than property, irrespective of property or 
special constraints.
101
  In other words, ―[p]ersonality rights focus 
on the être—the being—in contrast with the avoir—the having‖ 
and are significantly divorced from territory.
102
 
Privacy, as a personality right, is predicated on dignity.
103
  For 
example, Article 2 of the German Constitution (Grund Gesetz) 
provides that: ―everyone shall have the right to the free 
development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the 
rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or against 
morality.‖104  In the privacy context, the concept of dignity in 
Germany is encompassed within ―the right to free unfolding of 
personality.‖105  In America, by contrast, dignity ―falls under the 
rubric of privacy, including the zone of personal autonomy that 
emanates therefrom.‖106 
While very important differences exist between the approaches 
discussed above, conceiving of the right to privacy as a personality 
right, free of territorial constraints, generally allows the civilian 
legal method to grasp privacy as a zone of intimacy delineated by 
the basic needs of personhood, rather than by space or 
ownership.
107
  ―Personality allows one to define oneself in relation 
to society‖ and can, therefore, be a very important ―impression 
management‖ tool in the Internet age. 108 
More specifically and returning to duties, as Popovici observes 
 
define human dignity, nor human personhood or personality.‖); Adrian Popovici, 
Personality Rights—A Civil Law Concept, 50 LOY. L. REV. 349, 349–51 (2004). 
 101 See Popovici, supra note 100, at 357. 
 102 Id. at 352. 
 103 See generally Eberle, supra note 34. 
 104 See Eberle, supra note 34, at 976.   
 105 Eberle, supra note 34, at 966.  
 106 Id.  For a discussion of the many other differences that exist between the French and 
German concepts of privacy and dignity, and personality rights generally, compare 
Popovici, supra note 100, at 351 (discussing the French approach in which personality 
rights are private law rights first and foremost), with Eberle, supra note 34 at 979 
(―German personality law is thus a creature of the Constitutional Court, as rights of 
privacy are of the Supreme Court.‖). 
 107 Eberele, supra note 34, at 980.  (―Personality allows one to define oneself in relation 
to society.‖). 
 108 Erving Goffman, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 208-12 (Anchor 
Books Doubleday 1959). 
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in the French context ―personality rights, as subjective rights, 
comprise both an active and corresponding passive side.  The 
active side is the ‗power‘ of the right‘s holder over the object of 
the right; the passive side is the ‗duty‘ of others to respect this very 
same object.‖109  The dual emphasis is reflected in the 
controversial ―right to be forgotten,‖ as well.  Thus, (translated) 
―[a]dvocating in favor of a right to be forgotten must not lead to a 
‗deresponsabilization‘ of individuals.  The ‗right to be forgotten‘ 
does not mean that everyone will have the right to rewrite their 
personal history.‖110 
CONCLUSION  
ZUCKERBERG IS RIGHT—IN A WAY. . . 
The Civil law method‘s conception of privacy as personality 
rights with their countervailing duties (rather than the ‗right to be 
forgotten per se) appears commeasurable with the goals of privacy 
management in an age of rapid technological advances.  Using the 
personality rights paradigm, the primary harm consists of the loss 
of meaningful control over the integrity of information in identity 
management, rather than freedom from observation.
111
  However, 
the seemingly broad and dignity-centric conception of the Civilian 
system is pragmatically tempered by a profound attachment to the 
notion of duties alongside rights and fosters empowerment and 
responsibility. 
Perhaps, however, this glimpse into civilian thinking can 
eventually lead to an alternative approach to conceptualizing 
privacy in the digital context—namely, a cross-cultural one in 
which both Zuckerberg and Vladeck are (at least in part) correct.
112
  
 
 109 Popovici, supra note 100, at 354. 
 110 See Détraigne & Escoffier, supra note 64. 
 111 This is illustrated by the German example and its focus on ―informational self-
determination.‖ See Eberle, supra 34, at 980.  
 112 In fact, comparative analysis of this sort, as former chief justice of the Supreme 
Court of Isreal Aharon Barak observed, is an ―important source of inspiration, one that 
enriches legal thinking, makes law more creative, and strengthens the democratic ties and 
foundations of different legal systems.‖ Adam Liptak, U.S. Supreme Court‟s Global 
Influence is Waning, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/ 
world/americas/17iht-18legal.16249317.html. 
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That is to say that while the old notion of aloneness or seclusion is 
indeed passé, privacy as the inherent right and duty to control 
one‘s identity—and the harm to privacy being the loss of that 
autonomy—is very much alive.  The thinking underlying the duty 
theory in turn, as per the European tradition, can be harnessed 
towards a clearer definition of privacy-stakeholder obligation and 
an easier flow of data across borders. 
Accordingly, privacy is a matter of affirmative rather than 
negative rights, and consists of two parts.  First, privacy can be 
conceived as the right to engage in individual self-definition and 
self-invention, rather than a right to be secluded or free from 
surveillance.  Second, adopting civilian parlance, which correlates 
rights with duties, privacy is also the responsibility not to 
unnecessarily compromise one‘s own information in the naïve 
hope that the information will not be misused. 
Thus, in order to eventually craft a transystemically viable 
framework, it becomes critical to first clarify what privacy means.  
Furthermore, in light of the enduring and potentially devastating 
ramifications of privacy slip-ups and the difficulties associated 
with attempts to ―repair‖ related damage via ad hoc solutions, not 
hospitable to American notions of expression, corporations 
dependent on consumer trust and users themselves share a 
profound interest in rethinking the basic concepts that populate the 
current privacy frameworks.  If nothing else, European thinking, 
most notably the debate over the ―right to be forgotten,‖ can help 
advance that discussion significantly. 
 
